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Abstract
Social preference research has received considerable attention among
economists in recent years. However, the empirical foundation of social
preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students
as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in
experiments may behave systematically different than non-participating students
or non-students. In this paper we empirically investigate whether laboratory
experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social
preferences. Our first study shows that students who exhibit stronger prosocial
inclinations in an unrelated field donation are not more likely to participate
in experiments. This suggests that self-selection of more prosocial students into
experiments is not a major issue. Our second study compares behavior of students
and participants recruited from the general population in a trust experiment. In
general, we find very similar behavioral patterns for the two groups, but non-
students make significantly more generous repayments suggesting that results
from student samples might be seen as a lower bound for the importance of
prosocial behavior.
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1. Introduction
Social preferences such as concerns for distributional fairness and reciprocity
have received considerable attention in recent economic research (see, e.g.,
Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming). The empirical foundation of social preferences
is largely based on laboratory experiments using self-selected students as
samples. This is a potential problem, as students participating in experiments
might behave systematically different than non-participating students or non-
students. If participating students behave more or less prosocially than the
population of interest, our laboratory results provide a biased estimation of
the potential of social preferences for the analysis of economic outcomes. Were
this to be the case we would need to be more careful in plugging behavioral
assumptions derived from observations in the lab into models used to derive
implications for the general population.
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on whether laboratory
experiments with student samples systematically misrepresent social
preferences. In particular, we address two potential problems: First,
experiments rely on volunteers, creating a problem of self-selection. This may
bias outcomes in experiments if participants exhibit a stronger or weaker
prosocial inclination than people who do not participate. A priori, the direction
of a potential selection effect is unclear. If people’s participation decision is
mainly money driven, one might expect an overrepresentation of self-interested
payoff-maximizers in the participant pool. However, it is also possible that
social motives determine people’s decision to participate (e.g., people may
want to help the researcher or foster the advancement of science), which would
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speak for an overrepresentation of prosocially inclined participants.1 While a
drastic overestimation of prosocial motives would be especially troubling for the
literature on social preferences, it is, of course, also important to know whether
there is a bias in the other direction. Second, most laboratory experiments are
conducted with university undergraduates. While using students as subjects is
very convenient, they are not representative of the general population in many
dimensions. The important question for our context is whether they also differ
with respect to social preferences, so that using them as participants distorts
the measurements of social preferences in experiments.
Our first study analyzes whether participating students are more
prosocial than non-participating students. The ideal data set to test for
potential differences between participants and non-participants would provide
information on prosocial preferences of all students while observing who
participates in experiments and who does not. This type of data is usually
not available simply because we have proxies for preferences typically only
for participants in experiments. Moreover, if we know preferences from non-
experimental data, e.g., survey studies, we do not observe decisions to
participate in an experiment. In our first study we present results using a
novel data set that combines preference measures for both participants and
non-participants. In particular, we use a naturally occurring donation decision
as a measure of participants’ and non-participants’ prosocial inclination. Our
results show that students with stronger prosocial inclinations are neither
1Levitt and List (2007) and List (2009) focus on the latter possibility when they argue
that behavior in the lab might not be a good indicator of behavior in the field.
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more likely to participate in experiments (extensive margin), nor do they
participate more often (intensive margin). These findings resonate with a
complementary study by Cleave et al. (2010) who also don’t find a selection-
bias regarding social preferences. However, while Cleave et al. (2010) make use
of tutorials of introductory microeconomics to obtain a laboratory measure
of social preferences for about 600 students, we identify prosocial inclinations
using a naturally occurring field donation that gives us access to data for more
than 16’000 students. While both approaches have their advantages, the fact
that both studies ultimately emphasize a non-result makes a large number of
observations relevant, because it increases the precision of the estimation and
reduces the possibility to find a null-effect by chance. In fact, we show that our
sample allows us to estimate the null result with a small confidence interval.
Our second study uses a version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) to
investigate whether measurements of social preferences change if the usual
student subjects are replaced with participants from the general population. In
contrast to many existing studies, we use the same recruitment procedure, the
same instructions, the same decision process and the same financial incentives
for both our subject pools. Our results reveal no significant difference in first
mover trusting behavior between students and non-students. However, the
repayment level is significantly lower for students than for non-students. Our
results are in line with earlier studies that also show that prosocial behavior
is even more frequently observed with non-student participants (see e.g., Fehr
and List, 2004; Bellemare and Kro¨ger, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2008; Burks et al.,
2009; Belot et al., 2010).
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Our paper contributes to a recent methodological debate about the role
of experimental economics in the social sciences (see, e.g., Levitt and List,
2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009; List, 2009; Croson and Ga¨chter, 2010; Bardsley
et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2010; Ga¨chter, 2010). Some of this work has raised
serious concerns about the relevance of lab findings with regard to the role
of social preferences. This paper provides a step in empirically investigating
one issue raised in this debate. Our results suggest that using self-selected
student samples does not contribute to a systematic overestimation of social
preferences. On the contrary, the results of our second study indicates that
results obtained from student samples might be seen as a lower bound for the
importance of prosocial behavior. Of course, our results do not exclude that
laboratory experiments may provide distorted estimates of social preferences
for other reasons (such as low stakes, short durations, high degrees of scrutiny).
However, we see our paper as a starting point and hope that future research
will investigate the empirical relevance of other potential sources for biases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the field study on
selection of students into experiments. The question of whether students and
non-students have different prosocial inclinations is discussed in section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Do Social Preferences Predict Self-Selection?
2.1. Research Design
This section analyzes whether self-selection of students into experiments
leads to a misrepresentation of prosocial preferences in the participating part
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of the student population. We study decisions of students to participate
in experiments organized by the experimental economics laboratory of the
University of Zurich. Our sample consists of 16,666 undergraduates who
registered at the University of Zurich between the fall term 1998 and the spring
term 2004 and for whom registration at the University of Zurich is their first
enrollment at a University. For all those students, we know whether and how
often they participated in an economics experiment between the fall term 1998
and the fall term 2005. In total 1,783 students participated at least once, i.e.,
the participation rate is about 11 percent. Conditional on participating at least
once, the students participate in 2.5 experiments on average.
To measure the extent of all students’ prosocial inclinations we use a
naturally occurring prosocial decision at the University of Zurich as a proxy.
Each semester, every student has to decide whether or not he or she wants
to contribute a pre-determined amount to two social funds which provide
charitable services (financial support for foreign students (CHF 5) and free
loans for needy students (CHF 7), for further details, see Frey and Meier,
2004a,b, CHF 1 ∼ USD 0.85). Students can therefore give CHF 0, 5, 7 or 12
(both funds together). The level of possible donations is thus very similar to
stake sizes typically used in lab settings.
There are several features why these donation decisions constitute an
interesting proxy for social preferences. First, the measure does not rely on self-
reported survey responses but on actual decisions. Second, donation decisions
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are made in private and never made public.2 Third, students are unaware that
their behavior is analyzed in a research study. Fourth, and most importantly,
all students at the university have to decide about the donations. Thus, our
measure is not subject to any selection issue.
However, as with most field measures there are also potential problems.
Since the persuasive power of our results critically depends on the quality
of our measurement of social preferences, it is important to discuss in detail
the different measures we use and how they address potential caveats. Our
first measure (First Field Donation) only considers a student’s donation
decision when he or she first registers for a program. This measure has several
advantages. First, the university rules require that each student has to show up
in person at the registration office for the initial enrollment. This ensures that
we know with certainty that this first donation decision has been made by the
student him- or herself. Second, as the initial enrollment takes place before the
first semester starts, this measure is collected before students have taken any
courses at the University, before they have been exposed to any lab recruitment
efforts and before they have participated in any experiment. We can therefore
rule out the possibility of reversed causality as participation in experiments
cannot have influenced the decision to contribute to the funds. These features
make this measurement a particularly clean one.
2As researchers we got access to the data through the university administration under the
condition that we immediately anonymize the data after matching it with the experimental
data base.
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Our second measure (Average Field Donation) exploits information on
all donation decisions taken by a student. For each individual, we calculate
the average donation amount over all observed contributions. Using several
measures per individual has the advantage of reduced measurement error. A
potential problem is that the forms for registration renewals can be completed
at home. Therefore, we cannot be sure that it is the student him- or herself
who fills out the form. However, because students also have to provide details
regarding major and minor study subjects on the same form, it is quite unlikely
that another person can perform this task. To further increase the confidence
that the variable Average Field Donation measures an individual’s prosocial
inclination we use data collected by Benz and Meier (2008). They perform a
modified dictator game in the laboratory using a subsample of the students in
our data set as participants. It turns out that individuals with higher average
field donations transfer a significantly higher share of their endowment to the
recipient (Spearman’s Rho = 0.29, p < 0.0001). This provides direct evidence
that our field measure captures the same social motivations as the simple
experiments typically used in the laboratory. Finally, it is also reassuring to
notice that our two measures First Field Donation and Average Field Donation
are strongly correlated (Spearman’s Rho = 0.73, p < 0.001).3
3As robustness checks we also add estimations relying on a measure that counts
how often individuals have contributed to at least one of the two funds. This Individual
contribution rate correlates highly with the Average Field Donation (Spearman’s Rho =
0.92, p < 0.001).
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2.2. Results
Panel A in Table 1 reveals that participants differ in various dimensions from
non-participants. These differences indicate the relevance of self-selection of
particular groups of students. In Panel B of Table 1 we investigate whether this
selection is also associated with differences in prosocial inclinations. The panel
provides descriptive statistics of contributions to the two funds for participants
and non-participants. The summary statistic does not show any significant
difference between participants and non-participants. In their first decision,
the same proportion of participants and of non-participants contributed to at
least one of the two funds (75 percent) and, on average, they donate about
the same amount (CHF 8.39 vs. 8.45; p = 0.67 in a t-test). Figure 1 illustrates
that both the participation rate and the number of experiments a student
participated in does not significantly depend on individuals’ first donation
decisions. None of the differences are statistically significant. When we look at
all decisions of a student, it turns out that participants contribute on average
in 77 percent of all decisions, while non-participants’ contribution rate is 76
percent (n.s.). There is also no substantial difference in the average amount
donated (CHF 8.66 vs. 8.84; p = 0.09 in a t-test; see also the distribution of
average donations in Web Appendix Figure A1). Thus, the raw data analysis
does not reveal any significant difference in prosocial inclinations of participants
and non-participants.
Panel A of Table 2 reports Probit estimations, where the dependent variable
is an indicator variable for the decision to participate in experiments and the
independent variable is either the first donation (columns (1), (2), and (3))
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or the average field donation (columns (4), (5), and (6)).4 We report marginal
effects in brackets. Column (1) shows that students who contribute more money
in their first decision are not significantly more likely to participate in an
experiment than those who don’t. The marginal effect is essentially zero. As a
consequence of the large number of observations, our effects are quite precisely
estimated. The 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect is [-0.1, 0.1] (in
percentage points). This implies that a change in the magnitude of one standard
deviation in the first donation decision (s.d. = 5.2) is very unlikely to increase
(decrease) the participation rate by more than 0.6 (0.4) percentage points (i.e.,
an increase (decrease) of 5.6 (3.7) percent relative to the average participation
rate of 10.7%).
Column (4) reports a regression using the Average Field Donation as
a proxy for prosocial inclinations. This proxy is potentially influenced
by students’ experience at the University including their participation in
experimental studies. The results are very similar to the ones obtained from
using only the first decision: Individuals who contribute on average more to the
charitable funds are not significantly more likely to participate in experiments.
The marginal effects indicate that the participation rate of students who
contribute on average one CHF more is only about 0.1 percentage points higher.
This means that for an increase in the average field donation of one standard
deviation (s.d. = 4.1), the participation rate increases by only 0.4 percentage
points (i.e., an increase of 3.7 percent relative to the average participation rate
of 10.7%). Given the large number of observations the lack of a significant effect
4For results using contribution to at least one fund, see Web Appendix Table A2.
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is a strong result. The 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect is [-0.02,
0.2] (in percentage points) indicating that it is extremely unlikely that changing
the average field donation by one s.d. increases (decreases) the participation
rates by more than 0.9 (0.08) percentage points.5
In addition to participating for a first time, it is also interesting to
investigate if social preferences predict whether a student becomes a regular
participant.6 Column (7) and (8) show Tobit regressions with the number
of experiments an individual participated in as dependent variable. The
estimations show that both the ‘First Field Donation’ and the ‘Average Field
Donation’ are not good predictors for how often somebody participates in
experiments (this holds both overall and conditional on participating, see Web
Appendix Table A3 for additional specifications).
As the main purpose of this study is to detect differences between
populations (and not to explain these differences if they exist), the estimations
without controls are the most important ones. The descriptive statistics reveal
many significant differences between the two groups of interest (e.g., gender and
major). The question that we want to answer is: do these differences also imply
that there is a difference regarding social preferences between these groups?
To answer this question, it is important not to include controls (because the
5Cleave et al. (2010) use second mover back transfer in percent of the tripled first mover
investment in a trust game as their measure of social preferences. On average second movers
return about 25%. They find that a one percentage point increase in the percentage returned
decreases the participation rate by 0.09 percentage points. This is insignificant and the 95%
confidence interval is [-0.25, 0.06] (in percentage points).
6We thank John List for pointing out this second margin of interest to us.
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observable heterogeneity may exactly be the reason for the difference in social
preferences). Therefore, Columns (1), (4), (7) and (8) contain our main results.
However, it can be of separate interest whether there is selection for certain
groups. To investigate this question, we add two types of controls. In column (2)
and (5) we add ‘demographic’ variables (gender, age, foreigner status, number
of semesters, cohort dummies). The results don’t change. In columns (3) and (6)
we additionally control for the field of study. While the marginal effect doesn’t
change it becomes significant at the 5%-level.7 This indicates that for certain
majors, participants may select based on their field donation. Panel B of Table
2 shows separate regressions for different subgroups that might be interesting
for research on prosocial behavior. The results show that the marginal effect
is bigger for men than for women, but none is significant. The effects also
remains insignificant if we consider economists and non-economists separately.
If we estimate the effect for the field of studies that are most represented in
experiments (law and arts), we find a significant effect for students from the
arts faculty.
In sum, our results do not support the hypothesis that participating
students have different social preferences than non-participants. This suggests
that within the group of students the bias due to self-selection on social
preferences is likely to be small. While there might be some selection within
certain subgroups, these subgroups do not make up a sufficient part of a typical
7See Web Appendix Table A3 for the corresponding regressions with the number of
experiments an individual participated in as dependent variable. Adding controls does not
change the results.
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student sample to yield an overall significant effect. However, it is still possible
that student participants behave differently than participants recruited from a
more general subject pool. We investigate this question in the next section.
3. Do Students Have Different Social Preferences?
3.1. Research Design
We conduct two identical trust experiments using distinct subject pools for the
recruitment of participants. Contrary to most existing studies, we use the same
recruitment procedure, the same instructions, the same decision process and
the same financial incentives for participants in both experiments. Therefore
differences in prosocial behavior can only be caused by differences between the
two subject pools. All participants in the experiments live in Zurich. However,
while one group of our participants was recruited from the student pool at
the University of Zurich, the other group was recruited from a representative
sample of the population of the city of Zurich (for details on the recruitment
procedure of this study, see Web Appendix).
As participation was voluntary, both our groups of participants are self-
selected. In light of our first study it seems plausible to assume the absence
of important selection effects with respect to social preferences, but we cannot
directly rule out such a possibility with our data. However, our results are
informative in any case. Even if sorting takes place our study tells us whether
recruiting subjects from the general population yields a different measurement
of prosocial inclinations than recruiting subjects from a student pool. This is
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of practical importance as the vast majority of experiments and surveys relies
on voluntary participation.
To measure social preferences, we use a variant of the trust game (Berg
et al., 1995). Both subjects receive an endowment of CHF 20. The first mover
decides how much of his endowment to transfer to the second mover. The
transfer can be any amount in steps of 2 CHF, i.e., 0, 2, 4, . . . , or 20 CHF.
The chosen transfer is tripled by the experimenter and passed to the second
mover. Contingent upon the first mover’s transfer the second mover decides on
a back transfer. This back transfer can be any integer amount between 0 and
80 CHF. The first mover earns his endowment minus his own transfer plus the
back transfer of the second mover. The second mover gets his endowment plus
three times the first mover’s transfer minus the back transfer.8
In order to elicit second movers’ willingness to reciprocate, we used the
contingent response method (see Brandts and Charness, 2011, for a discussion
about the validity of the method). This means that each second mover, before
knowing the actual first mover’s investment, made a back transfer decision
for each of the 11 possible investments (0, 2, . . . , 20) of the first mover.
The advantage of the contingent response method is that it allows us to
measure each second mover’s willingness to reciprocate independently of the
transfer which he actually received. This is important, because it enables us
to make a clean comparison of the level of reciprocity, even if first movers
8First movers were also asked to indicate their expectation about the back transfer of
their second mover given their own transfer decision.
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behave differently between subject pools (for details on the procedure, see Web
Appendix).
3.2. Results
In total we have 1296 participants in the experiment (295 recruited from
the student pool, 1001 recruited from the general population). Students and
non-students differ in many socio-demographic dimensions. In particular, we
observe that non-students are on average older, more likely to be married, less
well educated, and more likely to be right-wingers (see Table A4 in the Web
Appendix). In this study we investigate whether students and non-students also
exhibit different prosocial inclinations. We start by examining trusting behavior
of first movers. A simple comparison of first mover transfers between the two
groups reveals only a small difference across the two subject pools (13.17 for
non-students vs. 13.47 for students). An OLS regression of first mover transfers
on a student dummy (column (1) of Table 3) reveals that the observed difference
of 0.30 is not statistically significant.9 The 95% confidence interval for this effect
is [-0.9, 1.5]. This reveals that it is very unlikely that first mover transfers of the
two groups differ by more than about 10%. While the uncontrolled regression
is the most relevant for our comparison of subject pools, it is also of interest
to investigate the role of observable differences. Including control variables
allows us to compare participants from the student pool to participants from
the general populations with similar socio-demographic backgrounds. Adding
control variables changes the sign of the student coefficient, but the effect
9All our results are robust if we use Tobit estimates to account for censoring.
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remains insignificant (see column (2)).10 Results in column (3) and (4) show
that the decisions of students and non-students are not driven by different
beliefs about the behavior of second movers.
We now turn to second movers’ behavior. Figure 2 shows the average
second mover back transfers conditional on first mover transfer. For every
possible first mover transfer students make lower average repayments than
non-students. All differences are statistically significant (see Web Appendix
Table A6 for the corresponding p-values). Averaging over all backtransfers,
students transfer back 15 percent less than non-students. The fact that students
transfer back less than non-students does not imply that they generally react
less sensitive to first movers’ transfers. In fact Figure 2 illustrates that the slope
between first mover transfer and second mover back transfer is very similar. Put
differently, students’ and non-students’ reciprocation pattern is very similar;
the only difference being that students reciprocate on a lower absolute level.
Column (5) of Table 3 confirms this. It shows an OLS regression with second
movers’ back transfers as the dependent variable. We regress back transfers on
a student dummy, the first mover transfer and the interaction effect between
student dummy and first mover transfer. The coefficient of the student dummy
is negative and significant, i.e., students transfer back significantly less than
non-students. However, the interaction effect is close to zero indicating that
10Controls variables are gender, age (and age squared), being an only child, being
foreigner, being married, having obtained the general qualification for entrance to university
or technical college, and political opinions. Full estimation results can be found in Table A5
in the Web Appendix.
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students and non-students exhibit a similar reciprocal inclination as suggested
by Figure 2. If we add socio-demographic controls to the regression (see column
(6)), the coefficient of the student dummy is no longer significant. This indicates
that students are not less prosocial than other participants with a similar socio-
demographic background, i.e., the difference between the subject pools is driven
by the fact that students and non-students differ with regard to their socio-
demographic background.11
4. Concluding remarks
This paper empirically tests whether laboratory experiments with students
systematically misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Such an
empirical test is critical as experimental methods become increasingly
important in economics and experimental results, especially those on social
preferences, often challenge insights and policy implications of standard
economic models.
Our first study shows that the degree of prosocial behavior in an unrelated
field donation does not predict whether (and how often) students participate
in experiments. This suggests that self-selection does not significantly bias
the social preferences measured in the laboratory. The results of our second
study reveal that student participants and non-student subjects show very
similar behavioral patterns in our trust experiment. While students make less
11Table A5 in the Web Appendix reveals that being married and being a political left-
winger significantly increase second mover repayments.
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generous repayments, their investment behavior, their beliefs about second
mover behavior, and their reciprocal inclination are very similar to those of
participants recruited from the general population.
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Figure 1. First Field Donation and Participation in Experiments
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Note: The figure shows the participation rate (left axis) and the average number of
experiments a student participated in (including students who did never participate, right
axis) depending on the first field donation in study 1. Distribution of First Field Donation:
25.20% contribute CHF 0, 4.19% contribute CHF 5, 5.68% contribute CHF 7, and 64.93%
contribute CHF 12.
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Figure 2. Back transfers of Students and Non-Students in Field Trust Game
 
Note: The figure shows average repayments of second movers in the trust game of study 2.
The lower line depicts average repayments of participants recruited from the student
subject pool of the University of Zurich. The upper line depicts average repayments of
participants recruited from a representative sample of the average population of the city of
Zurich.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Study 1
Non-participants Participants t-test/
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. χ2-test1
Panel A: Observable characteristics
Age at registration 21.94 4.21 21.07 2.87 p < 0.01
No. of semesters 5.34 3.26 5.97 3.15 p < 0.01
Gender (Women=1) 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50 p < 0.01
Nationality (Foreigner=1) 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 p < 0.05
Computer science 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16 p = 0.21
Economics & Business 0.13 0.32 0.14 0.34 p < 0.05
Theology 0.01 0.08 0.003 0.05 p < 0.05
Law 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.42 p < 0.01
Medicine 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.38 p < 0.01
Veterinary medicine 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 p = 0.64
Arts faculty 0.47 0.49 0.33 0.46 p < 0.01
Natural science 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 p < 0.01
Panel B: Prosocial behavior
Contributed in first decision (=1) 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.43 p = 0.80
First Field Donation 8.39 5.18 8.45 5.16 p = 0.67
Individual contribution rate 0.76 0.34 0.77 0.33 p = 0.20
Average Field Donation 8.66 4.15 8.84 4.05 p = 0.09
No. of observations 14,884 1,783
Note: The table presents summary statistics for people who never participated in an experiment and people
who participated in an experiment at least once. Panel A reports observable characteristics including the age of
the person at registration, the number of semesters for which we observe donations, the individual’s gender, the
foreigner status, and the individual’s field of study. Panel B summarizes our measures for prosocial behavior.
“Contributed in first decision” is unity if the individual contributed to at least one of the two charitable funds in
his very first decision and zero otherwise. “First field donation” is the amount donated in the very first decision.
“Individual contribution rate” is the fraction of all possible decision in which the individual contributed to at
least one of the two funds. “Average field donation” is the average amount that the individual donated in all his
decisions.
1 χ2-tests for categorical variables and t-tests otherwise.
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Table 3. First Mover (FM) and Second Mover (SM) Behavior in Field Trust Game
Dependent variable FM Transfer FM Belief SM Back Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Student 0.299 -1.486 0.821 0.588 -2.297** -0.118
(0.611) (0.797) (0.977) (1.467) (0.483) (0.904)
FM transfer 1.502** 1.445** 1.597** 1.623**
(0.053) (0.062) (0.036) (0.039)
Student x FM transfer -0.019 0.026 -0.056 -0.062
(0.108) (0.115) (0.067) (0.070)
Socio-demographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 13.17** 5.862* -2.675** -0.931 2.907** -6.602
(0.287) (2.589) (0.452) (3.302) (0.285) (3.779)
No. of observations 652 583 652 583 7,076 6,144
R squared 0.000 0.178 0.586 0.593 0.488 0.527
Note: The table investigates differences in first and second mover behavior in the trust
experiment of study 2. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS-estimations with average first mover
transfers as the dependent variable (robust standard errors in parantheses). Columns (3) and
(4) report OLS-estimations with average expected back transfers of first movers as dependent
variable (robust standard errors in parantheses). Column (5) and (6) report OLS-estimations
with second mover repayments as the dependent variable (robust standard errors clustered on
individual in parantheses). As repayment decisions are elicited with the contingent response
method, we have eleven observations per second mover (one for each possible first mover
transfer). “Student” is an indicator variable which is one if the individual has been recruited
from the student subject pool and zero otherwise. “FM transfer” is the first mover transfer.
“Student x FM transfer” is the interaction effect of the two. Socio-economic controls include
gender, age (and age squared), being an only child, being foreigner, being married, having
obtained the general qualification for entrance to university or technical college, and dummies
for political right- and left-wingers. Full estimation results can be found in Table A5 in the
Web Appendix.
Level of significance: ** p < 0.01, * 0.01 < p < 0.05
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